Introduction
In a democratic government, the Constitution
is defined in three parts of the executive, legislative and the judicial. The
constitution established the roles to each branch such that each of the
branches does check on the powers given to the other branch. In doing the
checks, there is always the provision of the system of balance in the
government thus describing as the system of checks and balances. At the same
time, it is regarded as the separation of powers.
The checks and balances can get expressed in
samples of the legislature making approvals of the presidential acts of
appointments and as well investigate the executive branch. The same legislative
does make approvals of the presideries choices of the judges and as well
provide proposals of the constitutional amendments. Within the same line, the
executive branch can check the judicial branch in a scenario such as the president
making the appointments of all the federal judges who cannot get fired by the
president. It is observed that the judiciary has the power of checking both the
legislative and the executive and acts as the final to the operations of the
executive and the legislative.
Conclusion
The interaction that is observed between the
executive, judiciary and legislature clearly give an evidenced conclusion that
the judiciary branch has more powers than the others. The executive branch
seems to highly depend on the judiciary ruling and checks the legislative
powers. The main legislature role of making the law is confined to the acts of
creating laws that react to the ruling thus changing the future ruling.
However, the judiciary branch takes to check both the legislative and executive
by determining the laws defined as unconstitutional or constitutional. In such
a practice, it is, therefore, realized that the judiciary ruling reflects the
provisions of the legislature and extends towards checking the executive. It is
only that the executive checks on the legislative while the legislative checks
on the executive branch as well.
Bibliography
Vanberg, G. (2001).
Legislative-judicial relations: A game-theoretic approach to constitutional
review. American Journal of Political Science, 346-361.
The article establishes an imperfect
information model that describes the interaction that is observed between the
legislatures and the constitutional courts (judiciary). The article provides
the model that well defines the legislative anticipation of the judiciary
branch, the legislative branch reactions towards the judicial ruling and the
impact of such reactions. The author aimed at presenting a simple prove of the
relationship that is between the legislature and judiciary thus trying to
eliminate the essence of measuring the most powerful branch. The article was
important towards establishing the relationship that exists between the
branches of the government.
Levitsky, S., &
Way, L. (2002). The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of Democracy,
13(2), 51-65.
The author gives the article a substantive
title of elections without democracy and provides the examples all the way from
the time of post cold war. In the discussion, the author aims at providing a
leveraged understanding about the role that each branch of the government
towards achieving democracy. They provide the rise of the competition of the
authority that enroots within the government. The article is evidenced towards
providing the rate at which the branches are competing. The article is useful
in establishing the balance that exists between the government branches.
Stephenson, M. C.
(2003). “When the devil turns…”: The political foundations of independent
judicial review. The Journal of Legal Studies, 32(1), 59-89.
The author provides an understanding of how
the foundation of a judiciary with powers can constrain the executive and the
legislative branches towards forming the government as defined by the rule of
law. The author simply shows how the judiciary looks powerful but again
contradicts the claim over how the political power underpins the powers of the
independent judiciary. The article gives the understanding of how the judiciary
is given a hand towards possessing more power than the executive and
legislature to ensure a stable government. The article was helpful by providing
the necessary understanding of the judiciary branch independence and how it
relates to the foundation and creation of a stable government.
Price, Z. S. (2014).
Enforcement discretion and executive duty. 67 Vanderbilt Law Review 671, April
2014; UC Hastings Research Paper No. 83.
The author establishes an understanding of
the constitutional structure and a better demonstration of the constitutional
authority of enforcing discretion. He goes further to highlight the existing
the challenges that are affecting the separation of powers. At this point,
there is the draw of details about the link and interaction that exist between
the branches of the government. The article provides an evidenced scenario on
how the executive branch tends to force out the execution of the deliverable of
the legislature and how the legislature and executive practices are under the
favor of judiciary. The article was great towards provides the best understanding
how the executive branch is critical and essential in a defined democratic
separation of powers government.
Benwell, R., &
Gay, O. (2011). The Separation of Powers. Parliament and Constitution Centre,
House of Commons Library, 15.
The author comes up with the argument of
separation of powers where they define the institutions of the government
standing independent and brings out evict that each branch should not have
powers that overdo the other functions. The article brings out the conclusion
that for the better functioning of the government disciplines; each branch
should undertake the functions within the defined context and provides an
understanding of the roles that each branch should execute to defined scope.
The article was useful towards measuring the system power according to the
function delivery thus understanding which branch has more functional powers.
References
Benwell,
R., & Gay, O. (2011). The Separation of Powers. Parliament and Constitution
Centre, House of Commons Library, 15.
Levitsky,
S., & Way, L. (2002). The rise of competitive authoritarianism. Journal of
Democracy, 13(2), 51-65.
Price,
Z. S. (2014). Enforcement discretion and executive duty. 67 Vanderbilt Law
Review 671, April 2014; UC Hastings Research Paper No. 83.
Stephenson,
M. C. (2003). “When the devil turns…”: The political foundations of independent
judicial review. The Journal of Legal Studies, 32(1), 59-89.
Vanberg,
G. (2001). Legislative-judicial relations: A game-theoretic approach to
constitutional review. American Journal of Political Science, 346-361.
Sherry Roberts is the author of this paper. A senior editor at MeldaResearch.Com in custom nursing papers if you need a similar paper you can place your order from custom nursing essay.
No comments:
Post a Comment